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Abstract 
This article contributes to recent debates about mutual recognition between 
states, and more broadly to discussions of the role of emotion in IR. It challenges 
‘moral claims’ made in some of the literature that inter-state recognition leads to 
a progressive erosion of difference or a pooling of identity; and underlying 
assumptions that recognition constitutes a stage in the development of states 
that have already established internal coherence. Instead it claims that processes 
of recognition are fractious and unstable, characterised by aggression and self-
assertion as well as affection and the creation of a ‘we-feeling’; and that such 
processes are an enduring feature of state identity. Using the case of Zimbabwe – 
a state that is clearly fractured, with an apparently insecure collective identity – 
the article explores how recognition both challenges and reinforces state 
selfhood through dynamics that are bumpy, intense and unstable. It moves on to 
develop a theoretical interpretation of these dynamics drawing on the work of 
psychoanalyst Melanie Klein, showing links between individual psychic anxiety 
and collective needs for a state that exists uneasily but inextricably in relation to 
others. The article concludes that international recognition works as a way both 
to establish and challenge state coherence. 
Key words: statehood, recognition, object relations theory, Melanie Klein, 
Zimbabwe 
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Introduction1 
Recognition – an idea adopted from Hegel – is understood as a way for members 
of a group to establish collective selfhood through their relation to, and 
difference from, other groups. In IR, recognition has been discussed in terms of 
formal, legal arrangements that confer statehood or group rights.2 But it has also 
been brought into IR as part of the ‘affective turn’, as a way to explore how 
emotional wellbeing is secured through collective identities.3 This article makes 
a contribution to this second use of recognition by exploring the way in which 
statehood becomes meaningful through the emotional attachments of citizens 
between each other and their state, through relations to the communities and 
states around them. 
 
                                                        
1Notes 
 I would like to thank Peter Vale, Jonathan Fisher, Teresa Almeida Cravo, Carl 
Death and Danielle Beswick for their helpful suggestions on earlier drafts of this 
article. Thanks too for the comments and ideas for improvements from the 
anonymous reviewers and editors of EJIR. 
2 This branch of the literature focuses on the mechanics of recognition between 
states (Fabry, 2010, 2013; Reus-Smit, 2011). This focus fits more closely into 
wider IR work on sovereignty (Jackson, 1993, for example) and international 
society (Bull, 2002; Buzan, 2004; Clark, 2005; Watson, 2009). 
3 On the ‘affective turn’ in IR see Crawford, 2000; Ross, 2006; Bleiker and 
Hutchison, 2008; Mercer, 2010. 
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Specifically, the article challenges the ‘moral claims’ made in some of the 
literature that recognition between states leads to a gradual erosion of 
difference. It argues that recognition is fractious and unstable, built on a dialectic 
between desires for oneness and separation. Because of this, recognition brings 
about a sense of identity that is ambiguous and complex, rather than certain and 
assertive. In making these arguments, I challenge progressivist understandings 
of recognition that suggest that it can or is somehow driving the world towards 
more peaceful relations between states or a postmodern pooling of sovereignty. 
  
I begin my argument with a discussion of state subjectivity in Zimbabwe, partly 
to underscore my rejection of the progressivist argument. Like others in Africa, 
Zimbabwe is a relatively new, post-colonial country seeking to develop 
coherence and construct a community. In recognition terminology, it is a country 
trying to establish a collective subjectivity –a ‘we-feeling’ – in relation to external 
others. This is a challenge because, as in many post-colonial states, Zimbabweans 
have relatively shallow attachments to the country, seeing their identities in 
terms of smaller ethnic groupings, or wider regional ones. As Vale (2003) argues, 
states in southern Africa are foreign creations, and have a weak hold on people 
who, in pre-colonial times, moved freely about the region. Today, languages and 
cultures straddle state-boundaries rather than fitting neatly within them. 
 
Zimbabwe might appear an odd place to start, as it seems to be pulling in the 
opposite direction to a substantial strand in recognition literature which takes 
state identity as already firmly defined, and looks beyond it to trends that erode 
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boundaries through recognition between different state-communities. In this 
approach, recognition within states has already brought about collective identity 
– a ‘we-feeling’. Now, driven by inter-state conflict and a further desire for 
recognition, established societies look beyond themselves for recognition from 
other groups. Such recognition promotes elements of shared identity between 
groups, widening the ‘we-feeling’. For Strombom (2014), such processes might 
resolve conflictual relationships, or deepen ties and solidarity between states; 
for Wendt (2003), this is the route to a Weberian-style world state. 
 
This suggests a situation in which some countries are trying to dissociate from 
their neighbours in order to establish a stronger state-centred identity, while 
others are trying to dissolve boundaries and forge closer connections with their 
neighbours. It could be a description of a world populated by different forms of 
state. Cooper’s (2003) typology, for example, sets up distinctions between pre-
modern, modern and post-modern states: the first (most African countries) 
without much empirical sovereignty; the second (the newly-emerging 
economies) jealously protecting and asserting their sovereignty; and the third 
(mainly European countries) prepared to pool sovereignty to create 
transnational organisations that enhance security, further economic growth and 
entrench shared values.  
 
In theoretical terms, the differences between these types and their international 
relationships can be understood through ideas about negation and recognition 
that draw on Hegel. For states in search of sovereignty and selfhood, 
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mechanisms of negation are employed in order to create and entrench 
difference. Negation is the tendency to project nastiness, inexplicability and 
chaos onto others in the international system in order to cement internal 
goodness, clarity and coherence. Zimbabwean president Robert Mugabe’s 
demonisation of Tony Blair and Britain in the early 2000s might be viewed in 
such terms: descriptions of the ‘British monster’, the ‘unnatural practices’ of 
Blair’s cabinet, the way in which Blair himself revived the ‘spirit of Cecil Rhodes’ 
were contrasted with a narrative of a heroic patriotic nationalism at home 
(Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2009; Tendi, 2010).  
 
In contrast, for states that are apparently certain of themselves, international 
relations are often described in terms of a struggle for recognition which, even if 
initially violent, establishes a mutuality which creates and embeds a collective 
identification, potentially erasing difference. Recognition in international 
relations, according to Honneth (2012), is about involvement in the affairs of 
another, moves towards a firmer sense of a collective. The European Union with 
its pooling of sovereignty on economic, legal and social areas is an exemplar. 
 
My argument is that these are not distinct processes, each belonging to a 
different type of state or even a different type of relationship. Both moves to 
differentiate from, and identify with, other groups are inherent to struggles for 
and experiences of recognition between states – and they are found within 
different ‘types’ of state. Because they are new, because collective selfhoods are 
uncertain and in flux, with tensions and anxieties much closer to the surface, 
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African states are particularly active in their search for a sense of self and other. 
However, they are not exceptional in how or why they do it. An African example 
therefore is instructive for an exploration of state subjectivity more generally. 
 
The theoretical basis of my argument is a Kleinian interpretation of Hegel. Here I 
am contributing to a tradition of reading Hegel through psychoanalytic theory 
(see for example Fanon, 1986; Honneth, 1995; Kojeve, 1996; Benjamin, 1996; 
Zizek, 1989), extending it by introducing it to the object-relations theory of 
Melanie Klein. She suggests that individual egos develop through relationships, 
and she stresses the ambivalence of such processes in a way that complements 
Hegel’s ideas about negation and recognition. Klein’s work thus provides a 
theoretical underpinning for how relationships reify the individual who realises 
herself through the projection of internal onto external objects, and through 
their reintrojection. In a process of piecing together objects, and differentiating 
between the internal and external worlds, the individual develops mature 
relationships. However, these are complex, bringing ambiguity rather than 
clarity, and engender an acknowledgement of division rather than a dispersal of 
it. For Klein, mature relationships establish a sense of the separation and mutual 
dependence of self and other; but they do so in a partial, fractured and unstable 
way. This makes Klein's theory a fascinating and compelling basis for 
understanding why groups underwrite individual wellbeing and how they do so 
through differentiation from other groups. For IR scholars, it provides rich 
potential insights into inter-state relationships. 
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Building on the case of Zimbabwe and the theory of Klein, I draw conclusions 
about international relationships of recognition. This account of recognition, 
built on empirical and theoretical foundations, leads me to refute both the ‘moral 
claims’ made for them by Wendt, Strombom and others, and realist or 
communitarian arguments about the predominantly conflictual nature of 
international relationships. I argue instead that relationships between states are 
both constructive and destructive. Through often turbulent and unstable 
relationships, states are able to establish and maintain a sense of subjectivity. 
 
In arguing against the ‘moral claims’ made for recognition I am not making a 
claim to be normatively neutral. My argument rests on those of Hegel and Klein 
who both make normative claims about individual fulfilment achieved through 
relationships of recognition. For Hegel these are ‘ethical’ and for Klein they are 
‘mature’. Individuals become more fully realised in such relationships, and 
therefore they are to be seen as richer than relationships that rest purely on 
negation or projection. In IR terms, as Honneth argues, individual wellbeing is 
enhanced by international relationships of recognition which help people 
develop a heightened sense of themselves. In my argument, there is also a benefit 
to the collective understanding of the community within which a more complex 
and ambiguous sense of self is fostered through recognition of and by other 
communities.  Relationships of recognition are therefore to be viewed as a ‘good 
thing’. However, the normative angle is limited in the sense that such 
relationships cannot be engineered, and where they do exist, they remain 
unstable and full of tensions. They therefore do not necessarily bring some of the 
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material benefits claimed for them, such as peace, as Abizadeh (2005), Wolf 
(2011) and Strombom (2014) suggest. 
 
 
Recognition and IR 
In a time-honoured IR tradition, theorising on the struggle for recognition draws 
anologies between the subjectivity of individuals and the subjectivity of states. 
However, it begins from a critique of the realist assumption that interests are the 
primary drivers of international relations, making the case that an emotional 
need to be recognised – emanating from political elites and/or addressing 
popular pressures – can explain state behaviour (Lebow, 2010; Lindemann, 
2013). Just as relationships between individuals enable each to explore and 
establish themselves through their encounters with others, states in the state-
system follow similar processes. This understanding is based on the Hegelian 
notion that the creation of selfhood is dependent on the ability to grasp the 
reality of a separate other. It is closely tied to literatures on identity in IR, the 
claim made being that state identity is relational and evolves, and that states’ 
drive for selfhood gives rise to aggressive struggles for recognition by others 
(Agne, 2013; Lindemann, 2012). Greenhill puts it this way: ‘recognition matters 
to international politics because it represents the process through which actors 
come to exist as actors within the international system and take on a particular 
identity within that system’ (Greenhill, 2008: 344). So, recognition confers 
statehood, establishes a basis for identity and thus fulfils a fundamental human 
need. 
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Hegel himself denied the possibility of substantial relationships of recognition 
between states. As Williams explains, for Hegel the key difference between free 
individuals and sovereign states-as-individuals is that the former comes into 
being only through recognition, whereas for the latter, sovereignty already exists 
and the state later turns outwards to look for recognition – a thinner form he 
calls negation which entails a positing of the otherness, the strangeness and 
difference of other states, defined essentially against or in opposition to the self. 
Sovereignty is rooted in internal coherence, the recognition of individuals within 
and with the state (Williams, 1997: 349). It depends only on its content, ‘its 
constitution and [present conditions]’, in other words, the state as a unit is real 
by virtue of its internal mechanisms; it is largely self-sufficient (Hegel, 1991: 
367). 
 
However Honneth, who has played a key role in explaining and building on 
Hegel, makes the case for the importance of recognition between states. He 
argues that there is a common desire for recognition within nations – as in any 
group – and that citizens’ wellbeing depends upon it. The population desires that 
its selfhood is recognised by other states and peoples, ‘the challenges it has 
overcome in the past, its power to resist authoritarian tendencies, its cultural 
achievements’ (2012: 142). For Honneth it is the job of the state to elicit 
international recognition, which it does symbolically or indirectly, and it does so 
not simply by projecting itself, but also by recognising other states, occasionally 
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even by making reparations for historical wrongs (2012: 144). All state actors do 
this, he suggests, because it is part of the way they shore up internal legitimacy. 
 
Honneth distinguishes between Hegelian negation and real recognition in his 
comparison of nationalism and the desire for recognition which is 
‘fundamentally directed towards the involvement, and not the exclusion, of other 
states… it neither demonises other peoples nor necessarily praises one’s own 
democratic constitution’ (2012: 142). It is this involvement that changes the 
quality of the relationship, acknowledging the idea of mutual shaping and 
dependence that the Hegelian model denied to international relations. Thus, 
adding to his largely positive account of recognition – characterised by love, 
respect and esteem (Honneth, 1995) – comes a rather gentle account of the 
struggle for it between states. 
 
In a similarly positive understanding of recognition, authors such as Wendt 
(2003), Abizadeh (2005), Wolf (2011) and Strombom (2014) have discussed the 
potential for recognition in eventually overcoming difference and thus conflict. It 
can establish a ‘shared identity’ (Wendt, 2003) or at least a mutual empathy 
(Strombom, 2014) that, even if begun as a violent struggle, has the potential to 
establish a better understanding of the other and so of a more harmonious 
world. This view that recognition can drive the world towards more peaceful 
outcomes is what Bartelson calls its ‘moral claim’ (2013). 
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Wendt makes arguably the strongest claim for the transformative potential of 
struggles for recognition (although his approach is teleological rather than 
moral). He argues that struggles between individuals, groups and states will 
gradually transform multiple egoistic identities into larger and larger collective 
identities.  In asserting the differences between individuals and groups 
recognition ‘paradoxically’ brings about solidarity between them: ‘When 
recognition is reciprocal, therefore, two Selves in effect become one, a ‘We’ or 
collective identity’ (Wendt, 2003: 512). As individuals establish mutual 
recognition they form groups which turn outwards to demand recognition from 
others. Wendt argues that, driven by technological advances in warfare, and the 
enduring emotional need for recognition, struggles between groups will 
establish recognition between them, forming larger groups. Eventually ‘the 
subjectivity of all individuals and groups [will be] recognized and protected by a 
global Weberian state’ (Wendt, 2003: 506). 
 
Three significant challenges can be made to moral and progressivist claims for 
recognition. The first is that in positing the ability of recognition to erode 
difference and separation in IR, these authors underestimate the extent to which 
recognition between some groups can only be achieved at the expense of the 
misrecognition of other groups. This critique has been admirably made by 
Neumann (1999), Markell (2003) and Bartelson (2013), who argue that an 
awareness of others beyond the group is necessary for group cohesion and 
identity – in-group identification needs a sense of an out-group to hold the group 
together. Thus closer cooperation and recognition within a group of states – the 
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European Union, for example – relies on the continuing ‘strangeness’ of other 
parts of the world – the Third World, the Islamic world or Eastern Europe 
(Bartelson, 2013). This suggests that there are limits to how far recognition can 
bring about a universal increase in harmonious relations, and provides a serious 
challenge to Wendt’s view that recognition will eventually establish a Weberian-
style ‘world state’.4  
 
The second challenge is that some of the claims made misunderstand the 
enduring dialectical nature of relationships of recognition and therefore 
overestimate their stability. This is a key concern of this article. Such 
relationships are more complex, fluid and problematic than is often assumed, 
comprising both positive emotions (such as affection, admiration, respect, 
esteem) and negative ones (such as aggression and competitiveness). Some work 
has been done in this direction. Greenhill, for example, highlights the cross-
cutting nature of groups and identity. Their ability to bind people together is 
only ‘half the story… Just as recognition of the “other” can be thought to affirm a 
sense of common identity, so too can we think of it as highlighting the key 
differences between “self” and “other” – and thereby accentuating their 
separateness without necessarily invoking any meaningful sense of shared 
                                                        
4 Wendt partially acknowledges this problem, suggesting the idea of a ‘temporal 
other’: ‘history becomes the Other in terms of which the global Self is defined’ 
(2003: 527). Similarly, Abizadeh argues that the lack of an external ‘Other’ can be 
made up for by mutual recognition between the state’s constituent parts (2005).  
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identity’ (Greenhill, 2012: 352). Neumann’s account of the work of Bakhtin and 
Levinas also points to a more complex understanding of otherness within groups 
(1999). Both Greenhill and Neumann see the ‘we’ created by recognition as at 
best partial and contested, often at odds with the assertion of individuality and 
minority-group identities within the wider collective. In other words, the ‘in-
group’ is a messy entity, containing internal contradictions as well as a sense of 
common identity.5 
 
The third challenge, which stems from the first two, is to the inherent sense of 
progress carried in this literature: in it, world history is tending towards a 
pooling of identity and an erosion of difference. This echoes a European 
philosophical tradition – from Aristotle, Rousseau to Mill, Marx and Hegel 
himself – that explains politics through ideas of historical stages. As Jahn (2005) 
has argued, such conceptions of progress were built on encounters with 
‘primitive’ people beyond Europe who apparently provided examples of early 
human development. This sense of human development was reinforced in links 
made between human history and Darwinian evolution. It is an idea that 
underpins conceptions such as Cooper’s ‘premodern’ states. Here, ‘progress’ is 
                                                        
5 Shilliam (2006) has explored a similar idea in a discussion of the way Hegel’s 
theory evolved as a response to the French Revolution. Hegel’s ideas about 
difference, he argues, rested on differences within Europe – between Germanic 
evolutionary reform and French Revolution – and demonstrate complex and 
internally ambiguous ideas about in-groups or a European ‘self’.  
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built on the idea of a European development and history that leaves other parts 
of the world far behind. However, a closer reading of an example from Africa 
challenges this idea. Most of Africa’s states came about through external colonial 
engineering rather than immanent processes. Their search for a sense of 
selfhood is troubled by these origins, as they attempt to assert selfhood and 
mutuality with neighbouring countries at the same time. Their experience of 
struggles for recognition therefore disrupt progressive notions of state 
formation, challenging the idea of a natural trajectory from state coherence 
through to a pooling of identity.  
 
In the following section I draw on Zimbabwean experiences to flesh out the 
second and third of these challenges. 
 
Zimbabwe’s neighbourly relations6 
                                                        
6 This part of the article draws on extensive qualitative research carried out in 
Zimbabwe between 2011 and 2014, in which Zimbabweans were asked to talk 
about their country’s relationship with the people and governments of the 
countries in the region. The people I interviewed were drawn mainly from 
residents’ associations, church groups and trade unions. They were from the 
cities of Harare and Bulawayo, the dormitory cities of Chitungwiza and Old 
Pumula and the northern rural area of Mashonaland Central. Most were middle 
class (who were or had been employed in the formal sector) or urban poor (who 
didn’t finish school and mostly now make a living through petty trading). 
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In creating their state, Zimbabweans continuously attempt to understand it as 
both part of the region and individual within it. These attempts are messy and 
fraught – sometimes mutually reinforcing and sometimes mutually destructive –
underlining an ambiguous sense of the state and its others. Like many African 
countries, Zimbabwe’s borders and state institutions were created, relatively 
recently, by foreign powers. The country’s population is diverse, comprising 
groups whose members speak several languages and see themselves as 
ethnically different, some expressing a close affinity to people on the far side of 
the country’s borders with whom they share cultural, linguistic and historical 
ties. Moreover, in recent years, relationships between the Zimbabwean state and 
large parts of the population have been poor, with state-organised violence, 
disputed elections, a collapsed economy and extensive emigration. Since 2008 
the country has lost many of the signifiers of sovereignty – the national airline is 
grounded, the national post office and train system are all but defunct and the 
currency has been suspended (the US Dollar and South African Rand are used 
instead). After much-disputed elections in 2008, in which violence against 
supporters of the opposition MDC party forced leader Morgan Tsvangirai to 
withdraw from the presidential run-off, a government of national unity was 
engineered by the neighbouring states. Privately, many Zimbabweans are 
financially reliant on travel and trade in the region and remittances from abroad.  
                                                                                                                                                              
Interviewees were recruited through a snow-balling method, beginning usually 
with grassroots civil society organisations, and working out to the people they 
worked with. Names of organisations and individuals have been changed. 
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Within difficult political and economic conditions at home, and an array of 
intense and often fraught international relationships, Zimbabwean citizens have 
developed their own ways of understanding and defining themselves in relation 
to the rest of the region. As a result, their relationships are complex and 
ambivalent, resting on a mixture of affection, support, competitiveness and 
aggression. These express a double and contradictory set of characteristics. On 
one hand there is a desire to be the same as, to be subsumed in, the other, and 
this might be viewed as a hangover of pre-state identities, or a reaction to a state 
that has alienated parts of the population. On the other hand there is a powerful 
assertion of difference which looks more like the projection or othering found in 
negation. This shapes powerful attachments to a collective Zimbabwean identity 
that can encompass state and society as a unit within or against the immediate 
region. Anxiety accompanies the ambivalence occasioned by these contradictory 
characteristics, leading the sense of self in relation to other to be tense and 
unstable.  
 
Fig 1 in here. 
 
Finding the self and the other 
Since the very early days of independence, Zimbabwe has been characterised by 
fractures between different groups, largely reflected in their relative proximity 
to the ruling ZANU(PF) party (Muzondidya, 2009). Geographically, those living 
on the edges of the country – particularly the largely Ndebele populations in the 
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south and west, and the people living in the far east of the country – have felt 
least connected to and represented by the Shona-dominated ZANU(PF) 
government which has attempted to define Zimbabweanness around a patriotic 
history rooted in Shona myth and culture (Ranger, 2004). 
 
People living in different parts of the country relate to neighbouring countries in 
different ways. Many Ndebele people are liable to express a strong sense of 
connection with South Africa. They emphasise the common history, language and 
culture they share with Zulus, coupled with their persecution and exclusion by 
the Shona-led government, and argue that this has led many Ndebele-speaking 
Zimbabweans to claim South Africa as their ‘real’ home. People will talk of feeling 
‘comfortable’ in South Africa, of it being like a ‘second home’, where people ‘are 
more like our family than people from Mashonaland’. They say: ‘In South Africa I 
can speak Ndebele freely, more than in Zimbabwe where I am forced to speak 
Shona… When we go there, we are not Zimbabweans.’7 This very idealised sense 
of the connection of Ndebele Zimbabweans to South Africa suggests an 
eradication of difference altogether.8  
 
                                                        
7 Civil society activist, Bulawayo, 27 May 2012.  
8 Sometimes people admit that this is a fantasy. One civil society activist based in 
Bulawayo told me: ‘People in Matabeleland often do idealise South Africa – but 
they get a shock when they go there.’ Interview, 11 November 2013 
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However, equally strong feelings of aggression and competitiveness also shape 
Ndebele understandings of their relationship with South Africa. People are just 
as keen to detail the differences and tensions between Zimbabweans and their 
neighbours. For example, Zimbabweans talk about the way in which the 
neighbours watch, profit from, and even enjoy, their declining fortunes. Here, 
competition seems a zero-sum-game: as people migrate and Zimbabwe empties, 
the neighbours fill themselves up. This competition depletes Zimbabweans’ 
sense of self. It cannot be shared because of difference: there is no ‘we-feeling’ to 
be gained as a result of this migration. Only the other gains. In a discussion with 
a group of religious leaders in Bulawayo – a group that had expressed feelings of 
comfort and fit in South Africa moments before – the attitude of the surrounding 
governments and people was described as one of reaping the benefits of 
Zimbabwe’s decline: 
 
They are buying time to use our people as cheap labour. They benefit from 
Zimbabwe’s problems. Zimbabweans are hard workers and well-educated. 
The most successful companies in South Africa and Botswana are run by 
Zimbabweans. Even Mozambique and Zambia are being changed by 
Zimbabweans.  
 
Yes, they are getting the cream of our people who are running away. And 
also, we support their industry, and we buy from them. Our people are 
going [to South Africa] to teach. All our schools are brain-drained because 
many of our best people go, even to Malawi. We train [them] and they go. 
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Maybe the neighbouring countries are taking our situation as a case study. 
We’re like a sacrificial sheep for the civilisation of Africa.9 
 
The inconsistency in this group’s approach to South Africa could be viewed as an 
appreciation of the difference between the experience of individuals and the 
wider effects on Zimbabwe. Even if an individual can be subsumed by South 
Africa – looking and feeling South African while living in Johannesburg – and the 
homes of their families can benefit from the remittances they send, the wider 
Zimbabwean collective is depleted by this abandonment. Well-kept individual 
homes are still surrounded by a fragile and failing public infrastructure; 
individual incomes are enhanced at the expense of Zimbabwean industries and 
schools. It conveys an ambivalence about Zimbabwe’s relation to the wider 
region: themselves sometimes an inseparable part of South Africa, and 
sometimes in danger of losing possession of a Zimbabwean coherence through 
their submersion. 
 
In other parts of the country Zimbabweans have less heightened attachments to 
neighbours, although they too express ambivalence. People talk with gratitude 
about the understanding and sympathy offered by Africans throughout the 
region: people understand the painful situations many Zimbabweans experience, 
often because they have been through similar experiences of political repression 
                                                        
9 Group of religious leaders, Bulawayo, 29 May 2012 
This is the accepted version of an article published by SAGE in European Journal of International 
Relations Vol. 22 No. 2, 384-407. Published version available from: 
https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066115588204 
Accepted version downloaded from SOAS Research Online: http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/26244/  
 
 
or economic deprivation. Such empathy is seen in the acceptance that 
Zimbabweans need to live and work in South Africa and Botswana; that they 
need to use the South African currency; that they need to travel to Zambia to buy 
basic foodstuffs. These countries are often described as ‘life-lines’ or ‘havens’; the 
people who live there offering sympathy because ‘they know what … [Mugabe] is 
like’.  
 
However, competitiveness and aggression are never far from the surface. There 
is a sense expressed by Zimbabweans who live in the north of the country of 
disquiet about the ways in which Zambia and Mozambique, once viewed as 
particularly backward and unmodernised, have now apparently managed to 
enjoy widespread, reliable electrification. While much of rural Zimbabwe 
remains without electricity, and supplies to urban areas are frequently 
suspended, Zimbabweans wonder bitterly at the ability of their neighbours to 
keep the lights on.  
 
More overtly aggressive feelings are expressed towards South Africans. Elements 
of projection or negation often creep in here, with references to South Africans’ 
averred propensity for violence and greed. There are many stories of the 
violence and intimidation directed at Zimbabweans who try to survive in what is 
sometimes described as a nightmarish, crime-ridden country. Feelings of disgust 
are expressed towards ‘unnatural’ South African food (suspicions abound over 
genetic modification, stories about double-yoked eggs and alien-tasting 
chickens), which seem to explain the preponderance of fat, lazy or even drunken 
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South Africans. Zimbabwe’s neighbours are described as having different 
personalities: Zambia and Mozambique shabby, poor and badly educated; South 
Africa fast and loud, violent and vulgar. 
 
The awareness of dependence on the neighbours, and the ambivalence produced 
by the accompanying sense of competitiveness and aggressiveness, is frequently 
expressed through anxiety over loss. This relates most concretely to the 
perception of the loss of people, but also in relation to the loss of capacity, 
culture and political autonomy. In thinking about relationships with 
neighbouring countries, Zimbabweans from across the country wonder and 
worry about the further fragmentation such loss brings about. Most concretely 
anxiety is conveyed in comments made by parents whose children are living and 
working in foreign countries. They express a sense of the depletion of family and 
country; elders are left without support while the Zimbabwean economy rots 
away, abandoned by the exodus of educated, energetic people. One young man 
described the situation very clearly: 
 
I have been thinking about South Africa but so many youths go there and 
their families here don’t benefit. It’s not much good for our country. It has 
made so many people relax, people say, even if I don’t go to school, I will go 
to South Africa. South Africa is not the solution. The solution lies within us 
Zimbabweans... If you take a young person from Zimbabwe and compare 
with South Africa you will see a difference, even in reasoning capacity... I 
think it has become a problem because we have become like a basket case 
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because we expect others to give us things and we no longer have the idea 
of doing things on our own.10 
 
On another level there is a more general unease that Zimbabweanness is being 
‘taken over’ by South African culture. Food insecurity has left them dependent on 
imports. And their state-controlled media provides increasingly unreliable and 
unpalatable news, leaving many to rely on news from South Africa. As they 
become more dependent, many fear their identity is being lost. 
 
Our culture has been invaded. Everyone watches the South African 
Broadcast [Corporation]. Our culture has changed but we are proud to be 
Zimbabweans. We love our country. 
 
It’s true: we eat South African foods. The Zimbabwean foods are hidden. 11 
 
And finally, anxiety is expressed about political involvement. The region’s states 
– collectively the South African Development Community (SADC) countries – 
have become deeply involved in Zimbabwe’s domestic politics.12 While many 
                                                        
10 Lovemore, Old Pumula, 30 May 2012 
11 Group of religious leaders, Bulawayo, 29 May 2012 
12 The SADC countries are Angola, Botswana, Democratic Republic of Congo, 
Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, 
South Africa, Swaziland, United Republic of Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. 
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welcome interventions – arguing that the regions’ leaders are the only actors 
with the authority to keep Mugabe in check – others express disquiet at the 
erosion of Zimbabwean sovereignty. As one civil society activist pointed out: 
 
A lot of political decisions are now made at SADC and not in this country. If 
this government makes a mistake we can only turn to SADC, not to 
ourselves. SADC is dealing with the political parties, not ordinary people. 
SADC must decide on elections. The country is now depending on external, 
regional bodies – up to the AU and even the UN… So yes, there is a gap 
between the people and the government. Now you see diplomats in front at 
the opening of Parliament.13 
 
Anxiety about the weakening of the state thus leads to assertions of Zimbabwean 
identity in the form of its culture, industrial capacity and state-society relations.  
Evidence of difference and competitiveness with neighbours lends urgency to 
the desire to hold Zimbabwe together. This sense of a whole Zimbabwe is further 
reinforced by the ways in which otherness can be turned around and applied to 
Zimbabweans as they are seen by their neighbours. For example, otherness is 
also understood in terms of the way in which Zimbabwean migrants damage the 
life-chances of poorer communities amongst the neighbours. It is recognised that 
large numbers of undocumented Zimbabweans undercut South African workers, 
fuelling resentment and leading to violent attacks. During a group interview with 
                                                        
13 Group of informal workers, Harare, 6 September 2011 
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trade union representatives from around Zimbabwe, there was a discussion 
about these difficulties: 
 
You knew they felt that when we go to South Africa, they felt as though we 
bring in money to buy in South Africa and the more we go, the more prices 
go up because of us, so we see a lot of Zimbabweans being targets; 
xenophobic attacks were targeted at Zimbabweans. Even … [in] Botswana, 
they don’t like the Zimbabweans. There’s a lot of harassment.  
 
It’s like when a lot of people migrated to South Africa [because] there was 
no food here, the Zimbabweans took lower wages and that’s when the 
South Africans initiated those attacks [against us]. 
 
In Botswana Zimbabweans were submitted to kangaroo courts and public 
whippings.  
 
With Zambia it’s different. They went through this during Kaunda’s time. 
They would sympathise but they said, we told you that this was what 
[would happen], we told you. You used to laugh as us for coming to buy 
margarine in your country.14 
 
                                                        
14 Group of trade unionist activists, Harare, 1 September 2011 
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This is an example of a ‘personalising attitude’ (Ikaheimo and Laitinen, 2007) an 
ability to view the effects one has on one’s neighbours through personal 
experience. It suggests a resonance between the communities – it is possible to 
put oneself in the other’s shoes, to draw on a shared repertoire of experience, 
and the history of mutual shaping, in order to understand both oneself and one’s 
neighbours. It also lends Zimbabweans powerful ideas of their own coherence: 
the sense of themselves, seen from other perspectives, as a distinct national 
entity. 
 
Ultimately, a key characteristic engendered by these relationships is the sense of 
internal ambiguity. The way Zimbabweans understand themselves in relation to 
their neighbours can be self-assertive, rooted in negation or projection. 
Examples include the ‘fat’, ‘lazy’ or ‘violent’ South Africans and the ‘backward’ 
Zambians and Mozambicans. But there is also an awareness of a more complex 
relationship brought about by other feelings about the relationships. There is the 
sense that both sides can prosper at the expense of the other, and this dynamic is 
seen from each side of the relationship. However, alongside this is the sense of a 
resonance of experience, of something shared that has engendered the idea of a 
mutual understanding. The dialectic between separation and mutual dependence 
infuses a painful self-awareness into both the relationship and into self-
understanding.15 
                                                        
15 I have argued elsewhere that the ambiguity of Zimbabwean self-understanding 
was played out in the 2013 elections, in which Mugabe and ZANU(PF) won a 
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This discussion of Zimbabweans’ understanding of their neighbours points to the 
ways in which international relationships can both challenge collective selfhood 
and reify it.  A powerful ‘we-feeling’ is created by the sense of a common history 
of colonial and post-colonial problems, of shared culture and language, and of 
mutual support and understanding. It is an outcome of history and a response to 
recent events. This ‘we-feeling’ can work to reinforce a sense of the 
fragmentation of Zimbabwe, as the neighbours’ affinity with Zimbabweans 
exacerbates their sense of alienation from their state, or other Zimbabweans. 
‘We-feeling’ can lead to a sense of Zimbabwe melting into the surrounding 
countries, losing itself in the region. Running counter to this is the way in which 
relationships with neighbours entrench a self of Zimbabwean selfhood. 
Difference personalises other states, highlighting apparently varying 
characteristics. It is reinforced by mutual competitiveness between them, the 
zero-sum sense in which one country’s gain is another’s loss. The resulting 
                                                                                                                                                              
landslide majority. Where once electoral politics was a polarised game between 
political parties that appeared to represent unambiguously distinct programmes 
and visions of Zimbabwe, the return of many thousands of voters to ZANU(PF), 
including in Matabeleland which has steadfastly supported opposition parties 
since independence, demonstrates an ambivalence towards the ruling party, the 
state and the country that encompasses an acknowledgement of the outrages 
and frailties of each alongside a sense of belief in the ruling party to represent 
authentic Zimbabweanness (Gallagher, 2015).  
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anxiety about internal coherence leads Zimbabweans to feel protective about 
themselves, and to attempt to assert valued differences. The ability of 
Zimbabweans to see difference from both their own and their neighbours’ 
perspectives also helps reinforce their coherence as they see themselves as an 
entity through their neighbours’ eyes. 
 
Zimbabwe offers a picture of contradictory processes which might be seen as 
giving way to the dominance of one set over another.  Could it be that, if state 
coherence develops, Zimbabweans will stop identifying so closely with their 
neighbours, and come to see themselves less complicatedly as part of a single 
Zimbabwean group? I suggest not, and in the next section of the article I use a 
theoretical approach to explain why Zimbabweans’ neighbourly relationships 
are – if particularly heightened and apparent – in fact typical of relationships of 
recognition. This will underline the over-arching point of the article: that 
recognition describes relationships that are continuously shaping state selfhood 
in shifting and contradictory ways. 
 
 
Struggles for recognition: a Kleinian view 
Hegel outlines the evolution of the self-conscious individual in a short passage on 
‘Lordship and Bondage’ in Phenomenology of Spirit, but, as Williams argues, the 
theme of how people become properly human and free through relationships is a 
‘deep structure in Hegel’s account of ethical life’, and permeates all his work 
(Williams, 1997: 2). Hegel describes the evolution of the individual from the first 
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stage of isolation, through early encounters with an other, negation, struggle and 
subjection of one by the other; through eventually to forgiveness and the mutual 
recognition that enables individual self-realisation and freedom. In negation, we 
see a rudimentary realisation of self and other as different because alternative, 
but here, the other is only what the self is not. In other words, it is still defined by 
the self. Recognition is much more difficult and complex, and it involves an 
acceptance of a radical otherness that is not defined purely by negation to 
yourself. But at the same time, the self that is realised through recognition is 
inseparable from the other, because true self-realisation and freedom are 
enabled and maintained by this relationship to the other. The individual 
develops a new consciousness, one that ‘is not purely for itself but for another’ 
(Hegel, 1977: 115). In Elements of the Philosophy of Right, Hegel describes how, 
on a number of different levels (family, civil society and state), the individual 
only achieves a fully ethical life through relationships; ultimately, only by 
belonging to a collective that represents and embodies ‘the universe of human 
life’ (Taylor, 1979: 51). 
 
In developing his own take on struggles for recognition, Honneth explores the 
resonances between Hegel and psychoanalytic object-relations theory which 
explains ego-development as brought about through relationships. He argues 
that there are strong resonances with Hegel's concentration on early family 
relationships at the core of individual development and the basis for ethical life: 
‘For it is only this symbiotically nourished bond, which emerges through 
mutually desired demarcation, that produces the degree of basic individual self-
This is the accepted version of an article published by SAGE in European Journal of International 
Relations Vol. 22 No. 2, 384-407. Published version available from: 
https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066115588204 
Accepted version downloaded from SOAS Research Online: http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/26244/  
 
 
confidence indispensible for autonomous participation in public life’ (Honneth, 
1995: 107). 
 
Drawing on the work of Winnicott, Honneth traces the way in which infants 
become aware of the world around them through constantly testing their ideas 
and fantasies (internal objects) with the people they encounter (external 
objects). This is how the infant begins to differentiate itself, principally from its 
mother, to realise itself as an individual (Honneth, 1995: 98-9). In particular, the 
infant employs destructive fantasies in relation to its world, testing the mother 
to see if she is objectively ‘real’. Only after the object survives the infant’s 
(imagined) attack, can she become for the infant a properly external object, 
beyond its control, but now able to contribute to the baby ‘according to its own 
properties’ (Winnicott, 1971: 90). Honneth likens this process to Hegelian 
struggles. The attempt to destroy the object makes it real and clearly separate – 
beyond the destructive control of the infant – and enables recognition by the 
subject.  
 
Like Winnicott, Melanie Klein details the role of aggression in object relations 
and the formation of the ego. Unfortunately, her work is relatively neglected in 
social theory (but see Alford, 1989; Segal, 1997), possibly because she made little 
attempt herself to address broader political themes. However, it includes a 
number of elements that add substantially to an understanding of recognition, 
and for this reason it is worth exploring her contribution to theories of how the 
self emerges.  
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Klein and recognition 
Klein was a psychoanalyst who built on Freud’s theory and worked, largely with 
children, in London from the 1920s until her death in 1960. Kleinian object 
relations theory posits an idea of the self as shaped through relationships. The 
individual is engaged in a constant comparison of her internal objects with the 
external objects she encounters in the world. Bowlby describes internal objects 
as ‘internal working models’. ‘Each individual builds working models of the 
world and of himself in it, with the aid of which he perceives events, forecasts the 
future, and constructs his plans’ (Bowlby, 1973: 203). For Klein, this constant 
comparison of objects is a process that gradually builds the ego, creating 
individuality. Her theory suggests that individual identity is embedded in, and 
created by, relationships. 
 
Klein describes object relations in the first months of life as ‘manic-schizoid’ 
(1997a). It is impossible to distinguish external from internal objects; all objects 
are fragmented and, as they stem from the life and death drives, viewed as 
wholly good or wholly bad. Klein used the terms ‘good breast’ and ‘bad breast’ to 
illustrate this, a formulation meant to describe the infant's complete separation 
of good and bad: sometimes the breast – or mother – is ideal, nurturing and 
loving while at others it/she is withholding and persecutory (Klein, 1997b: 180). 
The child reciprocates, fostering violent feelings of hatred for ‘bad’ objects and 
idealising, loving feelings towards ‘good’ objects. For Klein this state of affairs 
reflects the infant's conceptualisation of the world around her as completely 
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dominated by her own internal fantasies, projected onto objects that are really 
external, and reintrojected to become part of herself. Early life is thus 
‘characterized by a sense of losing and regaining the good object’, not only a 
connection to an external good object, but the sense of containing an internal 
good object (Klein, 1997b).  
 
As she grows and develops a more complex understanding of the world and her 
own separation from the objects in it, the child should become better at 
encompassing complex, ambiguous objects. She is able to acknowledge a sense of 
guilt as having (in imagination) hurt loved external objects, she makes reparative 
moves towards them and towards other objects (Klein, 1998b) and she develops 
a sense of gratitude to the people in her life who have survived her hatred and 
continue to represent goodness for her (Klein, 1997b). She also relinquishes her 
idealisation of objects, recognising that they are complex and ambiguous. Her 
relationships become more mature – characterised by love rather than 
idealisation – and her sense of herself reflects this: she can live with internal as 
well as external ambiguity.  
 
Healthy development should mean an increasing ability to see the world in this 
nuanced way, but relationships continue to be shaped in part by extreme or 
manic projections and introjections. In particular, imagination and fantasy – the 
projection of extremes – continue to allow the individual to conceive herself 
through her relations to the external world, particularly in times of stress or 
anxiety. As is the case throughout psychoanalysis, the psyche is never whole or 
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complete, but continues to draw on a repertoire of ways of functioning in, and 
relating to, the world. But this is particularly the case for Klein. Unlike Freud, 
who thought that human development progressed through a series of ‘stages’ 
(oral, anal, Oedipal and so on), each one being resolved before giving way to the 
next, Klein saw it in terms of ‘positions’ (manic schizoid, depressive) which could 
be adopted and reverted to throughout life. For Klein, selfhood is less firmly 
established through development, but continually subject to a variety of 
constructive and destructive relational positions. 
 
Klein adds to the model developed in important ways. In terms of the struggle 
for recognition, she views the projection of ideal love as also part of the object-
relations dynamic. For Klein, it is the splitting of external objects into ideally 
good and bad objects that is the key characteristic of the projection and 
introjection that enable very young babies to make sense of the external world. 
The desire to connect to an ideal good object is not discussed in the literature on 
negation and recognition, but, as I have argued elsewhere, it too plays a key role 
in social and political relationships (Gallagher, 2009; 2014). This idea is not at 
odds with Hegel’s struggles for recognition. Several of his most vigorous 
proponents have emphasised the struggle and its aggressive nature (Koveje, 
1996; Sartre, 1955; Fanon, 1986), and these tend to overlook the subtlety of his 
understanding of the contradictions within relationships and his interest in love. 
But Hegel writes very persuasively about love, particularly in his discussion of 
relationships within the family; and his concentration on ethical life within the 
state also contributes to this more positive aspect of mutual recognition. A 
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Kleinian take on recognition might thus enable more of a sense of its dialogical as 
well as its dialectical nature.16 
 
Moreover, Klein makes an important contribution to understanding the 
imperfections and instability of recognition once achieved. Her theory shows 
how splitting and the projective/introjective processes are gradually but never 
completely replaced with better-integrated, whole objects. Like Hegel, who 
emphasises the role of forgiveness in the transition from aggressive struggle to 
recognition (Williams, 1997), Klein discusses the role of the acceptance of guilt 
and reparation in the development of more mature relationships (Klein, 1998b). 
It is important to emphasise here that neither Hegel nor Klein suggest that 
forgiveness or reparation overcome the aggressive element of relationships. 
Hegel’s understanding of forgiveness is, in my interpretation, a necessary and 
ongoing element of recognition as part of its imperfection, rather than a 
resolution of it.17 And as Kristeva points out, Klein’s reparation never overcomes 
                                                        
16 On the important but neglected dialogical nature of processes of recognition, 
see Guillaume (2011) and Neumann (1999). 
17 In this I differ from Pippin (2007) who argues that Hegel treats forgiveness as 
a spiritual release or resolution of social division, an account he feels is at odds 
with Hegel’s more nuanced understanding of the fragility of human relations 
engendered by their mutual dependence. I would read ‘spiritual release’ more in 
the spirit of Catholic forgiveness which is predicated on the inevitable and 
ongoing transgressions that all humans are subject to because of original sin. 
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This is very much in tune with Klein’s understanding of the depressive position 
within which reparative acts are an acknowledgement rather than an 
overcoming of aggression. 
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the ‘psychic discomfort’ occasioned by aggression, but is merely ‘tolerated as a 
source of pain relating to the Other and a source of guilt about having taken 
pleasure in hurting him’ (Kristeva, 2001: 89). 
 
A Kleinian view of recognition would see it as an unending process, containing 
both idealisation and aggression, as well as the partial ability to integrate these 
extremes. This would mean that the complexity of external objects (of others) 
could be grasped, enabling a more grounded sense of self; but both would 
continue to be subject to extremes and idealisations too. 
 
Relationships of recognition are thus complicated and contain contradictions: 
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the self and other are separate and autonomous, yet mutually constitutive and 
dependent; they are different, yet find resonances within each other. Hegel 
describes this in the relationship of love within the family: ‘The first moment in 
love is that I do not wish to be an independent person in my own right and that, 
if I were, I would feel deficient and incomplete. The second moment is that I find 
myself in another person, that I gain recognition in this person, who in turn gains 
recognition in me. Love is therefore the most immense contradiction’ (Hegel, 
1991: 199). In other words, we both lose our individual identity in the other, and 
realise their fundamental otherness which affirms our individuality. Benjamin 
also describes recognition as dialectical and unstable, pivoting between the 
desire to destroy the other (through complete control and denial of his 
separation) and the need for recognition and love from a separate other 
(Benjamin, 1996: 209). Because of this, relationships remain fluid and frequently 
contentious, and the sense of a ‘We’ created through recognition is likely to come 
and go rather than remain stable. 
 
From individual to state  
The discussion has so far dealt with recognition on the individual level, where 
the individual is created by and through her relationships to the people, 
institutions or objects around her. Psychoanalysts deal with early familial 
relationships, and how these enable or inhibit the formation of the ego or self. 
The way in which an individual fits into a group is thus an essential part of her 
sense of self, and the group’s survival and status is of the utmost importance to 
her. Wilfred Bion, who carried out pioneering work on groups in the 1970s, 
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argued that ‘the group is essential to the fulfilment of a man’s mental life – quite 
as essential to that as it is to the more obvious activities of economics and war’ 
(1974: 53).  Bion also suggests that the unconscious dynamics within and 
between groups can lead to forms of group idealisation or denial in ways similar 
to those developed by individuals. In other words, the group identity becomes an 
embodiment of the individual writ-large, explaining her to herself through the 
ways in which she fits into the group, and through the ways the group is different 
from other groups. 
 
Building on similar insights, Hegel too discussed how individual subjectivity 
developed within in the context of family relationships of love, the looser 
connections in civil society and the ultimate ethical relationship of the individual 
to the state. This underpins why much of the work on recognition has dealt with 
the struggle for recognition of groups – minority groups within states, for 
example (Taylor, 1994), or national groups that have been colonised (Fanon, 
1986), and it is why more recently it has been taken up in IR to understand the 
ways in which states become states.  
 
As I outlined in the empirical part of this article, the individual citizens that make 
up the collective that is represented by and embodied in the state also 
experience relationships of recognition. If citizens are realised through their 
relationship to the state, the state’s recognition by other states engenders 
subjectivity which reflects importantly on their sense of themselves, both 
collectively and individually.  
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However, even if groups can help affirm the individual’s sense of herself, they 
still cannot provide a settled sense of selfhood. To explore this further, we need 
to return to the issue of progress raised in the introduction. There has been a 
long tradition of transplanting individual processes of ‘growing up’ onto the 
evolution of politics – seen in much European political theory, as already 
suggested. This was underlined by Freud (2002) in Civilization and its 
Discontents, in which his understanding of individual development is described 
as a series of stages to be worked through and left behind as the individual 
moves towards the next. In his work on civilisation he transplants this idea of 
development as progressive onto society: individuals join society as a way of 
repudiating the pressures and discomforts of what he terms ‘primitive’ desires. 
In Totem and Taboo, Freud (2005) adopted a European tradition of viewing 
‘primitive’ societies as examples of early human development.  
 
Klein’s idea of individual development is less dogmatically progressive. Although 
individuals may become better at piecing together part-objects, they remain 
subject to schizoid relations; we never transcend our early tendency to split the 
world and ourselves into bits, even if many of us are able to envisage ourselves 
and others as more complex objects as we mature. For Klein, then, there is never 
a complete self: selfhood is always emerging, a becoming through the unending 
shaping achieved through relationships. The ego remains susceptible to extreme 
splitting and projection of wholly good and bad objects, particularly in times of 
stress (Klein, 1998c). 
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For Klein, as I have argued, this leaves the individual in an uncomfortable 
position; uncertainly incomplete, and prone to regular anxiety about the 
contradictory nature of relationships that appear to both subsume the self and 
reify its difference. For her, maturity is an ability to tolerate anxiety and to live 
with incompleteness, never an ability to transcend them. Groups can help by 
expressing a sense of completeness and containment; they can also enable an 
acceptance of ambivalence by their ability to express complexity and internal 
contradiction. In the same way, states can become more substantial in the way 
they understand themselves within their region. The state absorbs and so 
contains individual anxiety by expressing a more confident, coherent selfhood in 
its relationships with other states. 
 
However, recognition between states also challenges certainty; it rests on both 
competitive difference and mutual dependence, and in doing so it reflects and 
expresses individual ‘psychic anxiety’. Recognition is therefore ambiguous and 
uncomfortable. As we have seen, Zimbabweans are caught in ambivalent 
relationships with their neighbours, expressing the complexities and anxieties of 
recognition. 
 
 
Conclusions and the conditions of recognition 
Recognition as I have understood it, is not the stable pooling of identity 
suggested by Wendt and other scholars who make ‘moral claims’ for it. Neither is 
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it a stage in the development of states that have established internal coherence 
as the orthodoxy claims. Using the case of Zimbabwe – a state that is clearly 
fractured, with an insecure collective identity, I have shown how recognition 
both challenges and reinforces state selfhood; that it is dynamic, bumpy, intense 
and unstable. Further, I have used Kleinian psychoanalytic theory to provide a 
theoretical interpretation of Hegel to create a way to understand how 
recognition works as a way to establish and challenge collective identity. 
 
In this final section, I draw the empirical and theoretical parts of the argument 
together to define the characteristics of recognition in IR. I argue that mature, 
what Hegel called ethical, relationships – those that involve mutual recognition – 
are rooted in three conditions, which are realisations about self and other. The 
first is that the subject and object realise that they are separate and autonomous; 
the second is that the subject and object realise that they create and shape each 
other; and the third is that the subject finds herself (partially) in the object. 
These three constitute a dense and unstable set of conditions reflecting the 
complexity of the way relationships shape selfhood, and I use them here as a 
basis for defining relationships of recognition. 
 
First, for the object and subject to be separate and autonomous means that 
recognition entails a move well beyond the object as a creation or negation of the 
subject. Projection and introjection are both predicated on the idea of the self in 
relation to an other, but they are realised in the way in which the other is shaped 
purely by the self. Hegel's idea of negation expresses the sense in which the other 
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is defined as what the self is not. Likewise, Kleinian introjection pulls an 
idealised other – also created through projection – into the self. In recognition, it 
is clear that the other is much more than a reflection of what comes from the self. 
When there is mutual recognition, the object has a life, feelings, a personality, 
ideas that are beyond the control of the subject: the object is a totally other 
subject. As Ikaheimo and Laitinen put it: ‘Having a recognitive attitude towards 
someone is relating to her as to a person, or having a “personalizing attitude” 
towards her’ (2007: 40). From a Kleinian perspective separation involves the 
acknowledgement of aggressive feelings towards the other. Difference is thus 
painful: it rests on envy and a sense of loss, both of omnipotence and of the ideal 
object. 
 
Second, at the same time that the object and subject recognise each other as 
apart and autonomous, each also understands the ways in which they create 
each other. For the autonomous, separate object and subject to create each other, 
they must accept their mutual dependence (Pippin, 2007). The subject is shaped 
by the object rather differently through projection and introjection. Even though 
the self may be altered by the other, it is altered only to the extent that the other 
is defined by the self: the other is the repository of the self's projected 
idealisation or aggression; the self is depleted by this projection, or draws it back 
in to affirm parts of the self. In recognition, mutual creation can be understood as 
a form of mutual dependence. Psychoanalytic object-relations theory describes 
this well, as Honneth has observed. Winnicott (1971) sums it up as an 
acceptance that the subject sees herself altered by her relationship with the 
This is the accepted version of an article published by SAGE in European Journal of International 
Relations Vol. 22 No. 2, 384-407. Published version available from: 
https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066115588204 
Accepted version downloaded from SOAS Research Online: http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/26244/  
 
 
object because of what the object is; Benjamin (1990), working a similar vein, 
describes it as the subject's awareness of her vulnerability to, and dependence 
on, the object. Recognition thus means an acceptance that the self is alarmingly 
shaped by a separate being with a mind of its own. To this, the Kleinian 
understanding adds ideas about reparation and gratitude: it is possible to mend 
objects and the relations between them by putting split objects back together 
again, and by acknowledging the ambiguity of the objects and being able to love 
them. 
 
Third, for the subject to fully realise herself, she must recognise something 
resonant between herself and this real, wider world constituted by other 
subjects. She realises that she makes sense in it. Hegel expresses this as being at 
home with yourself in an externality; Honneth describes it as finding yourself 
within a world whose structure is an expression of your own will (2012: 22). The 
Hegelian approach rests ultimately in the state which Hegel described as an 
organism made up of the constituent parts of all the individuals within it. For 
Williams, this is a delicate balance between the individuality of its members, and 
their commonality, their connection and creation of a ‘we’ in the state: ‘The task 
is to divide the powers while retaining their functionality as a whole. This can be 
the case only if the whole is present throughout all its members in spite of their 
differences… Each part is expressive of the whole organism, and the whole is 
present in each of its members’ (Williams, 1997: 342). The state, or the real 
world, although separate and beyond my control, gives back to me a sense of 
myself as belonging to it, not alien. This is not a coincidence but a result of the 
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mutual shaping between state and individual: the dependence works both ways. 
Thinking about this idea in relation to Klein, I suggest that her emphasis on 
psychic discomfort – the tension between hating and loving external objects, of 
feeling connection to them but realising that they are separate – helps represent 
this sense of resonance as embodying the way in which the individual is affirmed 
by her relationship with the whole. 
 
The case of Zimbabwe, understood in these terms, is an example of recognition. 
Difference even within close relationships of recognition is competitive and even 
aggressive. It can enable the subject to see an alternative perspective, but also 
contains elements of more aggressive projection and negation. Dependence, or 
the idea of mutual shaping, is about a taking in of otherness in the making of the 
self. In recognition, it is seen to work both ways. Dependence can also shade into 
a sense of being subsumed, apparently becoming one with the other, part of an 
idealising fantasy, but one that can also give rise to anxieties about the loss of 
self. And, as we have seen in Zimbabwe’s case in southern Africa, resonance 
encapsulates the difficulties in balancing the opposing impulses of difference and 
dependence. It is expressed in the idea of understanding and being understood 
by an other, but like the other two conditions of recognition, it can also become 
too dominant becoming more like sameness than an occasional ‘walking in step’. 
 
We have here an example of intense relationships that are rooted in a sense of 
mutual dependence and understanding. This is seen from both sides – part of the 
closeness and maturity of these relationships is their establishment of the other 
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as a subject, independent from the self, with each implicated in the fortunes of 
the other – and the ability to view the relationship from both perspectives. And 
yet, alongside the awareness of mutual dependence and sympathy, is an 
assertion of separation. This is seen in this case in an anxiety at the thought of 
becoming subsumed in the other, of losing selfhood altogether. It spills over into 
more aggressive projection and rejection of the other as alien as the ambivalence 
felt about the other gives rise to tension and instability. 
 
As the empirical section of the article shows, recognition matters to Zimbabwean 
citizens. What their neighbours make of them – from governments to citizens in 
the region – impacts quite profoundly on Zimbabweans’ sense of wellbeing. They 
engage with their neighbours; they puzzle about how they look to the neighbours 
and how the neighbours feel about them. They constantly compare themselves 
against the neighbours, and they assess how each shapes the other. Recognition, 
by this account, is not simply of concern to elites, but is closely connected to 
citizens’ sense of themselves and their country in the wider world. This supports 
Honneth’s argument that recognition is part of national wellbeing, and opens up 
new ways to think about what drives political elites to pursue recognition in 
foreign policy.  
 
However, this relationship of recognition is very different from one of respect or 
tolerance. It is denser, involving an attitude of judgement of the other rather than 
a looser, more agnostic attitude. It might therefore be thought of as an emotional 
attachment and sense of ‘our’ implication in the life and fortunes of the other, 
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and the other’s right to be implicated in our life and fortunes too. This conclusion 
contradicts Hegel’s assertion that recognition between states is limited and 
characterised only by negation; instead, it can be an important part of national 
subjectivity. Such a finding challenges tendencies in communitarian IR to neatly 
split thick domestic and thin international political relationships (Walzer, 1994). 
It certainly calls for a more nuanced understanding of difference in IR. 
 
 
 
 
